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Irvin McDowell came from Ohio, was only 42, and had spent most of his
army career on staff duty. He was well liked but somewhat enigmatic. Men
found him humorless, distant, reticent. He was a teetotaler, but
otherwise a glutton who could finish every dish on a table and follow it
with an entire watermelon. Many thought him haughty and unpleasant. But
the governor of Ohio pushed him on Lincoln for a major command, and so
did Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase of Ohio. Incredibly, their
pressure resulted in McDowell being made a brigadier general with the
same seniority as Mansfield. When Scott was told to select a commander
for the Army of Northeastern Virginia being formed in Washington, he had
to choose between the two, and having other work in mind for Mansfield,
he had no choice but to give the plum to McDowell. Thus, through
politics, a man with no practical experience at all became the hope of
the Union's major army.
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IRVIN MCDOWELL (LC)
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Immediately upon assuming command, McDowell found himself called on
to produce a plan of action. Vainly he begged for time. He and his army
were "green," he pleaded, inexperienced. So they were, agreed Scott and
Lincoln, but so too were the enemy. They must move, and quickly. Late in
May, McDowell rode across the Potomac and established his headquarters
in and around Arlington, until recently the home of Robert E. Lee. At
once he began formulating his plan of campaign, though what had to be
done was obvious enough. Patterson must move against Harpers Ferry and
the Shenandoah to contain Johnston, while McDowell would move along the
line of the Orange & Alexandria. He would take Manassas Junction
with an army of 35,000 men and, he hoped, without a fight. McDowell knew
that Beauregard had fortified the Manassas Junction and Bull Run fords
and that it would be costly to force crossings there. Though he refined
and evolved his plans as the campaign progressed, McDowell would
eventually decide to march toward Bull Run, occupy Confederate attention
with feint moves against the fords, and meanwhile move a large column
across the stream some distance upriver at an unguarded ford. Then his
column could move down the south bank of Bull Run, striking the
Confederates on their exposed flank, and virtually forcing them to fall
back from the other fords and the Warrenton Turnpike bridge to avoid
being overwhelmed. Once the balance of his army was safely across Bull
Run, then he could move on Manassas and overwhelm Beauregard's 22,000 or
so Confederates. He would march on the morning of July 16.
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PICNIC BASKETS AND PARASOLS
Like many battles, First Manassas left in its wake civilians whose
lives were affected by the conflict. Present on that day was a small
assemblage of sightseers who had hoped to view the battle as one would
a spectator sport. What was actually observed, however, would forever
change these casual attitudes toward war.
This group of curiosity seekers that had come out from Washington
City was composed of civilians, reporters, and politicians. They came
with the belief that there existed no personal danger due to the rout
that would occur when the Confederates caught mere sight of the Union
army.
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LISTENING FOR THE FIRST GUNS AT MANASSAS. (BL)
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The majority of the group reached only as far as Centreville, five
miles to the east of Manassas Junction. Here they picnicked while
listening to the thunder of the distant battle and watching the smoke
rise above the trees. One of these bystanders was a British reporter,
William Howard Russell. He describes the audience and the scene before
them in his diary:
"Clouds of dust shifted and moved through the forest; and through the
wavering mists of light blue smoke, and the thicker masses which rose
commingling from the feet of men and the mouths of cannon, I could see
the gleam of arms and the twinkling of bayonets.
"On the hill beside me there was a crowd of civilians on horseback,
and in all sorts of vehicles, with a few of the fairer if not gentler
sex. A few officers and some soldiers, who had struggled from the
regiments in reserve, moved about among the spectators and pretended to
explain the movements of the troops below, of which they were
profoundly ignorant."
After many hours of fighting the Union army was finally forced to
retreat. Another reporter, Henry Villard, was among the soldiers that
began an orderly retreat, yet, as is written in his memoirs, were
"reduced to the condition of a motley, panic-stricken mob. . . .The
morale of the army was gone, and the instinct of self-preservation alone
animated the flying mass."
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CONGRESSMAN ALFRED ELY
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One of the spectators that would learn the hard way that war was not
an entertaining event was New York Congressman Alfred Ely. He had come
to see for himself how the Thirteenth New York Volunteer Infantry, made
up primarily from his district, were faring. He remained with the group
at Centreville a short time and then, growing bored with such
observation, ventured even closer to the battle. East of the Stone
Bridge he was discovered by the Eighth South Carolina and barely missed
being shot by Colonel E. B. C. Cash, who, pointing his pistol at Ely's
head, shouted, "God damn your white livered soul! I'll blow your brains
out on the spot!" Ely was spared by the intervention of the soldiers
present, captured as a prisoner of war, and sent to prison in Richmond,
serving five months before he was released. In his journal, kept during
his incarceration, Ely contemplates the folly of pursuing those
activities that lead up to his capture:
"Among other things, I found that to visit battle-fields as a mere
pastime, or with the view of gratifying a panting curiosity, or for the
sake of listening to the roar of shotted artillery, and the shrill music
of flying shells, (which motives, however were not exactly mine,) is
neither a safe thing in itself, nor a justifiable use of the passion
which Americans are said to possess for public spectacle."
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Nothing in war goes as planned, and especially when so many are so
inexperienced. McDowell suffered under many handicaps, not least his own
limitations as a commander. Then there was the complete lack of adequate
maps of the countryside, even though Manassas lay scarcely 30 miles from
Washington. Neither did he have any substantial cavalry to send out in
advance to reconnoiter the ground. As a result, he would be moving
largely in the dark as to the countryside ahead of him, dependent on
local civilians who might or might not give him accurate information.
Equally bad, Washington was filled with Southern sympathizers who
observed every movement of the army and assiduously collected military
gossip in the hotel lobbies and taverns. As a result, even before
McDowell's men put out their campfires and marched south on July 16,
word had already reached Beauregard of their coming and their
intentions.
Early that morning the Yankee soldiers arose, expectant, excited,
determined that the march begun that day would take them "on to
Richmond" before the summer expired. Yet delay dogged them from the
start. Supposed to move in the morning, they did not get under way until
two in the afternoon. Their bands played martial airs, including
"Dixie," which at this stage was still popular on both sides, and "John
Brown's Body." The afternoon proved hot and humid, as all of the days
ahead would be in the northern Virginia summer. Men started breaking
ranks at every source of water, despite their officers' orders. No
blackberry bush could be passed without men stopping to strip it while
their comrades marched on. Quickly the generals saw just how "green"
this army in fact was. Some would conclude that it was little more than
a well-intentioned organized mob.
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ADVANCE OF THE FEDERAL ARMY AS THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN OPENS.
(ILLUSTRATION FROM THE SOLDIER IN OUR CIVIL WAR)
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As a result they covered only a few miles that day. They did better
on the morrow, though, and by nightfall of July 17 portions of the
Yankee army had reached and taken Fairfax Court House. Still, McDowell
knew that his movements were well observed by the enemy now. There was
no chance to surprise Beauregard, and he expected that he would probably
encounter stiff resistance at Centreville, a few miles north of Bull
Run. Thus he ordered Tyler's division to attack that place early on July
18 before Beauregard could consolidate a defense, but when Tyler arrived
expecting a fight, he discovered that the Rebels had pulled back.
Beauregard, heavily outnumbered, had pulled all of his army back to the
south side of Bull Run. He would make his stand there and hope that he
could stop the Yankees' advance. Tyler was elated. The Federals had
taken the first feared obstacle without a skirmish. The enemy was
retreating in their front. At this rate, they might just push on to
Richmond and all be heroes. Since McDowell had given Tyler orders to
push forward to "observe well the roads to Bull Run," Tyler pushed
forward on the road that led to Blackburn's Ford.
The ground destined to become the Bull Run battlefield ran more than
eight miles along the stream, from northwest to southeast, commencing at
Sudley Ford nearly seven miles west of Centreville. Thereafter came in
downstream succession the stone bridge over the Warrenton Turnpike,
Lewis' Ford, Ball's Ford, Mitchell's Ford, Blackburn's Ford, McLean's
Ford, and at the end of the line the rail road bridge of the Orange
& Alexandria line. Beauregard had scattered his brigades out along
these crossings from Stone Bridge to the last ford, ignoring Sudley for
the time being. Blackburn's Ford stood almost in the center of the line,
and there he stationed Longstreet and his Virginians, who now awaited
the coming of Tyler. The Yankee general rode forward toward Blackburn's,
and thanks to the heavy woods and underbrush on the south side of Bull
Run, he could not detect any appreciable number of Confederates.
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UNION SOLDIERS AT CENTREVILLE. VIRGINIA, LOCATED ABOUT FIVE MILES FROM
MANASSAS, (LC)
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SUDLEY SPRINGS FORD AND THE SUDLEY METHODIST CHURCH ON THE HILLTOP. (LC)
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Immediately Tyler thought he saw an opportunity. If he rushed across
Blackburn's Ford he could move straight on Manassas Junction and seize
it, accomplishing one of the main objectives of the campaign, seemingly
without meeting resistance. Despite McDowell's orders to do nothing more
than reconnoiter—and under no circumstances to bring on an
engagement—Tyler ordered the brigade of Colonel Israel Richardson
to come forward at once. A brief artillery duel ensued, and then Tyler
sent forward his first regiment, driving toward the ford.
(click on image for a PDF version)
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THE BATTLE OF BLACKBURN'S FORD, JULY 18, 1861.
Brigadier General Daniel Tyler orders Colonel Israel B. Richardson's
brigade to probe the Confederate position along Bull Run. As
Richardson's men approach Blackburn's Ford they come under fire from
Confederates concealed along the wooded bank. With the Confederate fire
growing more intense and realizing he has gotten more than he bargained
for, Tyler orders his men to withdraw. General James Longstreet sends
part of his brigade across Bull Run to pursue the retreating Federal
soldiers. The pursuit covers a short distance before the Confederates
are recalled back across the stream.
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For the next hour that regiment engaged with Confederate artillery
and resistance from sharpshooters, in spite of Tyler's belief that he
faced few foemen in his front. Then he sent in the rest of Richardson's
brigade, and soon the Yankee line swept down the sloping ground toward
the bank of Bull Run. What they met was stiff resistance, some of it
from unseen Rebels posted on the north side of the stream, and in the
end Tyler's artillery was forced back with some losses soon to be
followed by the infantry. Now Tyler decided that his idea of easily
crossing and pushing on to Manassas was out of the question. He had
reconnoitered, found the enemy in sufficient strength to know that
McDowell could not cross easily here, and had nothing more to do.
Unfortunately, it proved not to be so easy to pull men out of battle as
to send them in. One of Richardson's regiments was already charging as
Tyler issued his withdrawal order, and then another went in to support
it, and the battle continued to develop in spite of Tyler's desire to
pull out. Worse, the Yankees were getting the worst of it.
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LT. PETER HAINS FIRED THE BATTLE'S OPENING SHOT WITH A 30-PDR. PARROTT
RIFLE, AFFECTIONATELY REFERRED TO BY HIS MEN AS "LONG TOM." (HARPER'S
WEEKLY)
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THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE, MEN OF BOTH SIDES SOUGHT SHELTER IN AND AROUND
THE STRONG WALLS OF THE STONE HOUSE, AN AREA LANDMARK SINCE THE 1820.
(LC)
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Across Bull Run, Beauregard had expected the Federals might try a
crossing at Blackburn's Ford, Longstreet had been ready. He carefully
concealed his regiments in the woods and brush and that morning allowed
the men a leisurely breakfast despite suspecting that they might be
fighting before long. Men said the Lord's Prayer over and over again,
threw away their dice and playing cards, repented their sins, and
otherwise tried to square themselves with the Maker in case they should
fall in the fight. When Tyler's advance parties first appeared and
commenced their artillery fire, inexperienced soldiers initially thought
the sound of cannon balls flying overhead was the sound of horses
whinnying. They soon learned otherwise, however, and initially
Longstreet's line wavered until he personally rode along its rear, sword
drawn, whacking it on the backs of men thinking of fleeing. His example
helped steady them before the next two infantry assaults came at them.
Jubal Early in reserve sent reinforcements. and together they held their
ground, driving off the last of Tyler's Yankees.
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