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Throughout the late hours of April 2 and early morning of April 3,
retreating Confederate columns stretched into the darkness, while behind
them the night was made day by the glow of fires and explosions as
military stores and contraband were destroyed. The flames in
Petersburg remained localized to a few warehouses, but those in Richmond roared
out of control when mobs of civilians intent on looting made fire
control impossible. A substantial portion of the city's business area,
still known as the Burnt District, disappeared in the conflagration.
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THE "BURNT DISTRICT" OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA. (LC)
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Lee's men were now moving west in four broad streams. The
northernmost files of troops came out of the Richmond defenses. Led by
the one-legged Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, these units—which
included a battalion of C.S. naval personnel whose vessels had
been scuttled and a detachment of black Confederate troops—passed
through Richmond and crossed the James River to take up routes to Genito
Bridge across the Appomattox River. The center stream of soldiers, under
Major General William Mahone, came out of the lines dug across the
narrow neck of a river peninsula known as Bermuda Hundred. Mahone had
been instructed to use Goode's Bridge in his passage over the
Appomattox. When his men passed through Chesterfield Court House they
found it, as the general later reported, "crowded with. . . women and
their children—who had fled mainly from Petersburg."
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ROADS TO APPOMATTOX: A DESPERATE RACE
Lee's forces were spread over a front of more than 30 miles defending
both Petersburg and Richmond. It was necessary for him to first
consolidate these scattered units and re-supply them for the hard march
to join Johnston. On the night of April 2, all of Lee's men began to
move on routes chosen to converge at Amelia Court House, where Lee
expected to find much-needed rations. Grant astutely recognized Lee's
dilemma. He did not pursue Lee, but instead moved his troops to head Lee
off from any chance of turning south. As long as Grant maintained a
substantial number of men between Lee and North Carolina, Lee's army was
doomed.
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MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM MAHONE (LC)
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET (BL)
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The third column consisted of troops that had held Petersburg at
nightfall, April 2. The infantry, for the most part, belonged to the
corps of Lieutenant Generals James Longstreet, A. P. Hill, or Major
General John B. Gordon. The mercurial Hill had been killed in the April
2 fighting, so Longstreet commanded his men as well. These troops
crossed to the north side of the Appomattox River, then turned west
along parallel roads, headed toward Bevill's Bridge. Time was the
critical factor. Lee had to get his various columns across the
Appomattox as rapidly as possible so that they might concentrate and
resupply at Amelia Court House with enough lead over their pursuers to
be able to make the turn south toward Danville. The men themselves were
in a surprisingly good mood. A Louisiana artillery officer, Napier
Bartlett, ascribed it to at last "getting rid of some hideous dream in
leaving behind the trenches, and once more moving in column on the
road." A number of civilians also joined this exodus. According to an
officer in the retreat "almost all [were] on foot, but sometimes there
were wagons and carriages loaded with them."
South of the Appomattox River and west of Petersburg, the remnants of
George Pickett's and Fitzhugh Lee's commands, defeated at Five Forks,
along with other forces led by Major General Bushrod Johnson—making
up the fourth stream—fell back toward Amelia Court House,
hard-pressed by Sheridan's cavalry. These Confederates, under the
overall command of Lieutenant General Richard H. Anderson, moved with
heavier hearts. "There were not many words spoken," recalled J. F. J.
Caldwell, a South Carolina officer. "An indescribable sadness weighed
upon us." Numerous creeks and streams cut across Anderson's route, and
his rear guard made brief, stubborn stands at several, including
Namozine Creek, Sweathouse Creek, Deep Creek, and Beaverpond Creek. Also
passing through this region, along the Richmond and Danville Railroad,
were departments of the C.S. government, which had begun to
evacuate the capital at nightfall, April 2. The train carrying
President Jefferson Davis and members of his cabinet moved across Lee's
front early on the morning of April 3.
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THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC MOVES INTO THE FORMER
CONFEDERATE STRONGHOLD OF PETERSBURG AFTER
ITS FALL. (LC)
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MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES GRIFFIN (NA)
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The number of men with Lee remains the subject of some controversy.
Southern historians, led by the redoubtable Douglas S. Freeman, put the
totals at "28,000 to 30,000." Yet, historian Chris Calkins, working backward
from the number of soldiers who were counted when they surrendered at
Appomattox, adding known campaign losses, and factoring in a number for
desertions, suggests a more likely figure of approximately 57,000.
Union troops entered Petersburg and Richmond shortly after dawn,
April 3. U. S. Grant spent a few hours in Petersburg (where he met with
President Lincoln, who was on an extended tour of this theater of
operations) but soon had his columns marching westward. "I was sure Lee
was trying to make his escape and I wanted to push immediately in
pursuit," he later wrote. "I hoped to capture them soon."
Sheridan's riders led the way, pressing closely on the cavalry and
infantry that had escaped from the collapsed right flank. Supporting
Sheridan were foot soldiers from the Fifth Corps, now led by Brevet
Major General Charles Griffin in the place of Gouverneur K. Warren, who
had been relieved of command by Sheridan immediately after Five Forks.
Closing up behind these were the Second and Sixth Corps, also with the
Army of the Potomac, along with units from the Army of the James's
all-white Twenty-fourth and all-black Twenty-fifth Corps. Taking up the
rear was the Ninth Corps, which had orders to
garrison Petersburg and to secure the supply lines reaching westward to
keep pace with the hard-marching troops.
Grant had made a critical decision during his few hours in
Petersburg. He would not have his troops cross to the north side of the
Appomattox River to follow the retreating Confederate forces; rather, he
would move as rapidly as possible on a course parallel with Lee's men
to prevent them from heading south. Major General George G. Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, protested this plan, but Grant overrode
him. The race was on to overtake Lee's columns before they could make
the critical turn toward a linkup with Johnston's army. The only problem
was that Lee's men had a twelve-hour head start.
After personally supervising the withdrawal of his rear guard from Petersburg, Robert
E. Lee rode west following the lines of Longstreet's and Gordon's men. Some 22 miles
along this route he received a not unwelcome dinner invitation from
Judge James H. Cox to come with his staff and other officers to the Cox
home, Clover Hill. The offer was accepted and the house soon crowded
with uniformed men eager to forget, if only for an hour, the perils
facing them. Judge Cox's daughter Kate paid special attention to the
guest of honor.
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VIEW OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, CIRCA 1865. (NA)
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KATE VIRGINIA COX LOGAN (FROM MY CONFEDERATE GIRLHOOD: THE MEMOIRS
OF KATE VIRGINIA COX LOGAN)
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"General Lee," she assured him, "we shall still gain our cause; you
will join General Johnston and together you will be victorious."
"Whatever happens," Lee replied, "know this—that no men ever
fought better than those who have stood by me."
It was well Lee enjoyed this brief respite, for soon after leaving
Clover Hill troubles began to pile onto his
shoulders. He learned that Bevill's Bridge, intended to be
used by Longstreet's and Gordon's men was flooded out. This left these
troops no option but to angle northward to Goode's Bridge, already
crowded with Mahone's soldiers. There would be delays; some of the
precious lead would be lost. Compounding this crisis, Lee was also told
that the materials intended to shore up the Genito Bridge so that
Ewell's men might use it had not arrived. Unless Ewell could find
another way across the Appomattox, he too would have to use the Goode's
span. (Fortunately, Ewell's men were able to plank over the Mattoax
Railroad Bridge and cross by that means, though the process was a slow
one.)
After a short rest at Hebron Church, Lee passed over Goode's Bridge a
little after 7:30 A.M. and rode on to Amelia Court House, which he
reached before midday, April 4. Here he discovered that the supplies he
had expected to be waiting for his men had not been sent. As one of his
officers, E. P. Alexander, later put it, "We should have gotten rations
here, but in all the crash we had come through many plans had been sure
to miscarry, and the plan to have rations here for us had been one of
them." It was a terrible blow to all
of Lee's calculations. "No one who looked upon him then," an
artillery officer later recorded, "as he stood there in the full view of
the disastrous end, can ever forget the intense agony written upon his
features." John Esten Cooke, a staff officer, was even more explicit,
claiming that the "failure of the supply of rations completely paralyzed
him."
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GENERAL LEE ASTRIDE HIS TRUSTED MOUNT, TRAVELLER. (LC)
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LIEUTENANT GENERAL GRANT WITH HIS HORSE, CINCINNATI. (LC)
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Lee had hoped to pause at Amelia Court House only long enough to
provision his troops and to allow the tail end of his strung-out columns
to catch up before turning south, through Jetersville and Burkeville,
toward Johnston's army. Instead, he would have to wait here until
quartermaster details could fan out into the surrounding countryside to
fetch all the food and forage that might be found. In a proclamation
issued that day to the "Citizens of Amelia County, Va.," Lee asked for
"meat, beef, cattle, sheep, hogs, flour, meal, corn, and provender in
any quantity that can be spared."
Adding urgency to these appeals was the steady crack of carbine fire
that could be heard to the south. Up to this time, the Federal pursuit
had been more expectation than fact, with the Appomattox providing an
effective screen for Lee's left. But once over the river at Goode's
Bridge, Lee lost that shield, so the Yankee cavalry could swing up to
strike at the exposed column wherever an opportunity could be found.
U. S. Grant's decision to use Phil Sheridan's cavalry as his turning
force at Petersburg had the added result of placing this mobile striking
force in the van once the operation turned from assault to pursuit. In
Philip H. Sheridan, Grant had an aggressive, hard-driving combat leader
who was not likely to allow the enemy any slack. Almost from the moment
the Confederate retreat began, Sheridan divined that Lee's goal was the
Richmond & Danville Railroad and took steps accordingly. Even as two
of his divisions went yapping on the heels of Richard Anderson's
retreating command, Sheridan ordered his third (with a hustling Fifth
Corps in support) to take up a blocking position across the railroad
near Jetersville.
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MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP H. SHERIDAN (NA)
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MAJOR HENRY H. YOUNG (FROM FOUR YEARS IN THE SADDLE BY HARRY GILMORE)
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Still not satisfied that he was doing all that he could to bring the
enemy to bay, Sheridan galloped ahead of his troops and approached
Jetersville late in the afternoon of April 4, accompanied only by his
200-man personal escort. "I at once deployed this handful of men to
cover the crossroads till the arrival of the [Fifth] corps," Sheridan
wrote. Hardly had they begun to take up defensive positions when a Rebel
courier was captured coming down the road from Amelia Court House, just
six miles away. Taken with the messenger were duplicate dispatches from
Lee's commissary general urgently requesting that rations be sent to
Burkeville. Seeing an opportunity for some covert action, Sheridan
turned these messages over to his resourceful chief of scouts, Major
Henry H. Young.
These scouts—disguised in either
official Confederate uniforms or otherwise nondescript
clothing—infiltrated Lee's retreating columns to gather information
or to sabotage that movement whenever possible.
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Although one of the smaller commands engaged in the Appomattox
Campaign (Sheridan later acknowledged its strength as "thirty or forty
men"), Major Young's band had an influence far out of proportion to its
size. Operating singly or in small groups, these scouts—disguised
in either official Confederate uniforms or otherwise nondescript
clothing—infiltrated Lee's retreating columns to gather information
or to sabotage that movement whenever possible. One Confederate cavalry
officer never forgot the C.S. quartermaster major, whose dogged
insistence that each wagon team be watered at a certain stream held up
that wagon train for hours. Only later, when as a POW he saw this
"major" conferring with his Yankee colleagues, did the cavalryman
realize that he had been duped.
Now Major Young decided to have his men continue the captured
messages on their way. With Federal troops astride the Danville line,
any supplies sent along it would be sure to fall into their hands. As a
further refinement, Young sent out two pairs of his scouts in different
directions each bearing a copy of the original orders. One duo continued
south along the rail line hoping to reach a station still in telegraphic
connection with Danville while the other struck west, intending to get
the same message through to the C.S. supply depot at Lynchburg. In
summing up the activities of Major Young's unit, Sheridan wrote that the
"information gained through him was invaluable."
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SHERIDAN'S SCOUTS
As the war unfolded there became a need for reliable
information on the strength and location of the enemy. Early in
the war General George B. McClellan used the Pinkerton Detective
Agency to gather information on Confederate strengths. The Confederate
army also utilized spies; some of the best reported to Colonel John S.
Mosby. In October of 1864, while in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia,
General Phillip H. Sheridan organized a group of scouts under the
command of 22-year-old Major Henry Harrison Young.
Sheridan and his troops were operating in the Winchester area in the
fall of 1864 having chased Jubal Early's Confederates back into Virginia
from Maryland, where they had threatened the capital of Washington.
Sheridan needed to gather information on the activity of the rebel
cavalry as it operated in the vicinity of his army. Young volunteered to
join Sheridan's staff and was promoted to major on Octoher 12 with the
title of chief of scouts. Young was given the
authority to select one hundred men from Sheridan's army, of whom he was
to have the sole command. They had freedom to go wherever they wanted
and acted entirely according to Major Young's discretion. These men
dressed in Confederate uniform, spoke with southern accents, and could
infiltrate rebel camps to gain firsthand knowledge of strengths and
movements. Known as "Jessie Scouts" by the Federals, they devised hand
signals to let their fellow soldiers know it was them when in the
presence of the unknowing Confederates.
During the Appomattox Campaign the scouts proved to be of invaluable
assistance to General Sheridan and the Federal cavalry. They began the
campaign by capturing General Rufus Barringer, a Confederate cavalry
commander from North Carolina, and his staff as they were looking for a
comfortable camp for the night near Namozine Church. The scouts then
proceeded to capture a dispatch from General Robert E. Lee requesting
supplies to be sent to his army at Amelia Court House. Sheridan had the
scouts send the message, but his cavalry were to capture the supplies
for themselves. The scouts,
even though they worked in groups of three or four, were responsible for
leading numerous rebels to capture.
One of the final acts of the scouts would lead directly to the surrender
of Lee's army. On the afternoon of April 8, Sergeant White of Young's
command reported to General Sheridan that there were trains loaded with
supplies for the rebels at Appomattox Station on the South Side
Railroad. Sergeant White had been one of the scouts responsible for
sending the captured dispatch from Lee and he had been on the lookout for
the supplies since then. Sheridan dispatched his lead division under
George A. Custer to capture the trains, which they did, taking away much
needed supplies for the rebel army. This also placed Custer, and the
rest of the Union cavalry, solidly in front of the Confederate advance.
Surrounded by Federal troops, Lee would surrender the following
day.
For the gallant and meritorious conduct of his men and himself, Henry
Young was promoted to lieutenant-colonel on July 18, 1865.
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Throughout the afternoon of April 4, Sheridan's full attention was on
holding the blocking position near Jetersville. He sent messages off to
his three cavalry divisions to join him and also requested heavy
infantry reinforcements. There were some tense hours while Sheridan's
small command waited for the first of these to arrive. It was late
afternoon when the leading infantry elements came on the scene. The
veteran foot soldiers knew exactly what to do. Remembered one in the
155th Pennsylvania, "The Fifth Corps immediately occupied the cavalry
works, and in a short time with pick and shovel had them thick and
high." "As the enemy was within striking distance no fires were lighted,
and the corps was kept in readiness for battle," added a Maryland
comrade. "We seem to have cut the rebels off," a Maine infantryman noted
in his diary. This observation echoed one Sheridan had made earlier in
the day in a message to U. S. Grant: "If we press on we will no doubt
get the whole army."
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