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FROM DALTON TO RESACA
A direct attack on Johnston at Dalton would require the Federals to
penetrate Rocky Face Ridge, a chain of steep hills west of Dalton, by
way of Buzzard Roost Gap. Not only was this a naturally strong position,
but the Confederates had turned it, as Thomas put it, into a "slaughter
pen" by means of fortifications, massed artillery, and damming a creek
so as to create in front of it an artificial lake that could be crossed
only by way of a railroad trestle. Therefore, Sherman early on decided
not to try to break through this "terrible door of death." Instead he
would force Johnston to abandon Dalton by outflanking him.
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CHATTANOOGA TO OOSTANAULA
Thanks to Rocky Face Ridge, an almost continuous line of steep,
rugged hills, Johnston's Confederate army enjoyed at Dalton a naturally
strong defensive position which it had rendered virtually impregnable to
frontal assault by fortifications and other obstacles at Buzzard Roost
Gap, the main passageway through the ridge. Realizing this, Sherman
feinted against Dalton with Thomas's Army of the Cumberland and
Schofield's Army of the Ohio while sending McPherson's Army of the
Tennessee swinging south via Snake Creek Gap to cut the Western &
Atlantic Railroad, Johnston's supply line, at Resaca. This flanking move
surprised Johnston and compelled him to evacuate Dalton, but owing to
inadequate strength and his own lack of aggressiveness McPherson failed
to cut the railroad and prevent Johnston from retreating unmolested to
Resaca.
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His initial plan for doing so called for McPherson's Army of the
Tennessee to make a deep southward thrust to Rome, Georgia, thereby
cutting Johnston's direct rail link to Alabama and threatening the
Western & Atlantic Railroad, his supply line to Atlanta. The plan,
however, was based on the assumption that before the campaign began,
four, or at least two, additional divisions belonging to the Army of the
Tennessee would reinforce McPherson. By May it was apparent that none of
these divisions would arrive in time and that McPherson would continue
to have just 23,000 troops, a force Sherman deemed too small to
undertake safely so long a march so far from the rest of the Union army.
Hence he needed a new plan and needed it quickly, for Grant had ordered
the offensive in Georgia to begin at the same time as his in
Virginia—May 5.
Such a plan was available. It came from Thomas. Back in February his
cavalry had discovered an undefended mountain pass called Snake Creek
Gap that led straight to Resaca, a railroad station on the north bank of
the Oostanaula River eighteen miles south of Dalton. Why not, Thomas
proposed to Sherman, send his Army of the Cumberland through Snake Creek
Gap to Resaca where it would block both Johnston's line of supply and
line of retreat?
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FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE FORCES SKIRMISHED HERE AT BUZZARD ROOST,
GEORGIA. (USAMHI)
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SHERMAN STARTED HIS DRIVE FOR ATLANTA FROM RINGGOLD, GEORGIA. (US
MILITARY ACADEMY LIBRARY, WEST POINT, NY)
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Sherman adopted Thomas's plan—but with two major modifications.
First, McPherson's Army of the Tennessee, not the Army of the
Cumberland, would execute the Snake Creek Gap maneuver. Second, instead
of seizing and holding Resaca, McPherson was to break the railroad
there, then fall back to Snake Creek Gap, where he would wait to pounce
on Johnston's army as it retreated to Resaca as a consequence of having
its supply line severed. Assailed on the flank by McPherson and from the
rear by the pursuing Thomas and Schofield, the Confederates either would
be destroyed or else forced to flee into the barren wilderness of
northeast Georgia. Sherman believed that in this way he could achieve
with less force and risk the same outcome Thomas's plan envisioned. It
also would enable McPherson and the Army of the Tennessee to garner most
of the glory of carrying out the move that produced the defeat of the
Confederates in Georgia.
Johnston realized that the Federal offensive was about to start.
Although he hoped that Sherman would oblige him with a frontal assault
on Rocky Face Ridge, he expected him to do exactly what Sherman
originally had intended to do—pretend to move against Dalton while
sending a strong force to strike at Rome. Accordingly, on May 4 Johnston
telegraphed Davis and Polk requesting that the latter send a division
and a brigade from his Army of Mississippi to defend Rome. Davis
promptly authorized Polk to go at once with a division and "any other
available troops" to that town. Interpreting this statement literally,
Polk headed for Georgia with practically all of his infantry—two
divisions—and Major General William H. "Red" Jackson's cavalry
division. Davis, on learning of what Polk had done, was dismayed—he
wanted to retain all of Polk's cavalry in Alabama-Mississippi so that it
could raid Sherman's supply line—but decided to let Polk's move
stand in the belief that Johnston now would have ample strength to repel
Sherman and then at long last launch an offensive into Tennessee.
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HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL THOMAS AT RINGGOLD, GEORGIA ON MAY 5. (LC)
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Starting on May 5, Thomas and Schofield advanced from the northwest
and north toward Dalton while McPherson moved down from Chattanooga by
way of Lee and Gordon's Mill, Ship Gap, and Villanow toward Snake Creek
Gap. On May 8, having been notified that McPherson was a day's march
from his objective, Sherman ordered Thomas to engage the Confederates on
Rocky Face and Schofield to feint an attempt to bypass it on the east.
This they did, with some of Thomas's troops seizing the northern end of
the ridge and others almost breaking through a weakly held pass called
Dug Gap. Meanwhile, McPherson reached, then passed through, Snake Creek
Gap. He met no opposition whatsoever and not so much as a single
Confederate vedette patrolled the pass.
So oblivious was Johnston to the threat posed by Snake Creek Gap that
on May 7 he had responded to a report that "McPherson's Corps" was
moving southward from Lee and Gordon's Mill on the road to Lafayette by
ordering Brigadier General George Cantey, commanding the garrison at
Resaca, to come to Dalton. Fortunately, upon further consideration, he
had canceled that order, but not until shortly after dark on May 8, when
a telegram arrived from Cantey stating that "Cavalry scouts report
Yankees in vicinity of Villanow today" did he become concerned about a
possible enemy foray against Resaca via Snake Creek Gap. Even then,
however, he thought that any attack on Resaca most likely would take the
form of a cavalry raid and that Rome remained the true danger point.
Therefore, he merely sent a Kentucky mounted brigade to reinforce
Cantey, confident that it would give him sufficient strength to hold
Resaca.
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ALFRED WAUD ILLUSTRATION OF THE BATTLE OF DUG GAP. (LC)
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At mid-morning on May 9 McPherson set out from the southern end of
Snake Creek Gap for Resaca, seven miles to the east. Although he had
been instructed by Sherman to make a "bold and rapid movement," his
march was cautious and slow, the consequence of "considerable
resistance" from the Kentucky cavalry, dense undergrowth, and above all
a growing fear on his part that a strong Confederate force might descend
from the north and cut him off from the gap. Thus it was mid-afternoon
before his advance reached and seized a hill overlooking Resaca.
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THE BATTLE AT MILL CREEK GAP. (LC)
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SHERMAN'S ARMY MARCHING THROUGH RESACA. ILLUSTRATION FROM FRANK LESLIE'S
THE SOLDIER IN THE CIVIL WAR.
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Only about 4,000 Confederates, including the Kentuckians, defended
the village and the railroad bridge over the nearby Oostanaula River,
the destruction of which would cut Johnston's supply line. McPherson, in
contrast, had at least 15,000 troops available for an attack, not
counting a division he had detached to guard his rear. Nevertheless, he
merely skirmished with the Confederates until evening, then withdrew to
Snake Creek Gap. Subsequently he explained that Resaca appeared to be
held by a "considerable force" which was "pretty well fortified" and
that Dodge's XVI Corps was "all out of provisions." But his real reasons
for not even attempting to take Resaca or at the very least tearing up
some of the railroad track north of the place was that he believed he
lacked sufficient strength to do these things and at the same time fend
off an enemy thrust against his flank and rear from the direction of
Dalton.
While understandable, McPherson's fear was unfounded. Not until the
night of May 9 did Johnston learn, via cavalry reports, that "Logan and
Dodge under McPherson are on an expedition to Resaca," whereupon he
ordered two and a half divisions under Hood to Resaca. Thus McPherson
had ample time and security in which to execute Sherman's instructions
to break the railroad and then withdraw to Snake Creek Gap.
Having received a 2 P.M. message from McPherson that he was "within
two miles of Resaca" Sherman lay down to sleep at midnight on May 9
confident that "I've got Joe Johnston dead!" Then, on the morning of May
10, another dispatch arrived from McPherson in which he reported the
failure to cut the railroad and the withdrawal to Snake Creek Gap.
Disappointed and baffled—how could McPherson not have damaged the
railroad at least a "little"?—Sherman decided to go ahead with a
change in plan that Thomas and he had discussed yesterday, namely to
march the entire army through Snake Creek Gap to Resaca in the hope of
"interposing" it between Johnston and the Oostanaula.
On May 11 and 12 Hooker's XX Corps, followed by Palmer's XIV and
Schofield's XXIII Corps, joined McPherson's forces at the mouth of Snake
Creek Gap, leaving behind Howard's IV Corps to hold Johnston in check at
Dalton. Johnston, however, quickly detected what Sherman was doing and
so on the night of May 12 retreated to Resaca. There, the following day,
he deployed his army, which had been augmented by Major General William
W. Loring's Division of what now in effect was Polk's Corps, along a
line of hills to the west and north of Resaca, with its left anchored on
the Oostanaula and its right flank covered by Wheeler's cavalry.
(Official Confederate practice was to identify units above the level of
regiment by the name of their commanders whereas in the Union army all
units had a numerical designation. This is why in the text corps is
capitalized when referring to Polk's Corps and to the IV Corps, but not
capitalized when a Union corps is described as being, for example,
Howard's corps. The same holds true for references to divisions and
brigades.) As he did so, Sherman advanced from Snake Creek Gap and took
up a line roughly paralleling Johnston's. Meanwhile, the IV Corps
occupied Dalton, then followed in the wake of the retreating
Confederates and by evening was in supporting distance of the rest of
the Union army.
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BATTLE OF RESACA, MAY 14
Assuming that Johnston was merely conducting a delaying action at
Resaca to cover further retreat, Sherman ignored a proposal by Thomas to
feint an attack against the Confederates there while sending a strong
force across the Oostanaula to outflank them. Instead he launched an
assault against the center of Johnston's line designed to pin down his
army while Union cavalry cut the railroad south of Resaca. Johnston
easily repulsed the assault, then had Stevenson's and Stewart's
divisions of Hood's Corps strike the exposed Union left flank. Initially
this thrust went well, but after being checked by Federal artillery it
was driven back by a counterattack delivered by Williams's division of
Hooker's XX Corps. Meanwhile, on the Union right, a portion of Logan's
XV Corps stormed a hill overlooking Resaca and the bridges over the
Oostanaula, then repelled Confederate efforts to retake it.
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During the Vicksburg campaign Sherman had become personally
acquainted with Johnston's prudent tactics. Perhaps for this reason he
assumed that Johnston would not attempt a serious stand at Resaca, with
a river at his back, and instead merely would conduct a delaying action
designed to cover a resumption of his retreat. Accordingly, on May 14 he
ordered portions of the XX, XIV, and XXIII Corps to press the
Confederate center in the belief that it would give way easily.
He could not have been more mistaken. Not only did the Confederates
stop the Federal assaults cold, but Johnston launched a counterattack by
the divisions of Major Generals Carter L. Stevenson and Alexander P.
Stewart, both of Hood's Corps, with the object of turning the Union
left, which was held by the IV Corps, and cutting Sherman off from Snake
Creek Gap (what McPherson had feared would happen to him on May 9).
Stevenson's Division overlapped, then struck the flank of Major General
David S. Stanley's division of the IV Corps, driving it back in
disarray. For a while only Captain Peter Simonson's six-gun battery,
firing canister, kept the Rebels at bay. Then Brigadier General Alpheus
S. Williams's division of the XX Corps, having been summoned from
reserve in the center, came onto the field and with deadly volleys drove
back Stevenson's troops, thereby causing Stewart's to retreat also.
Meanwhile, on the Union right, two brigades of the XV Corps stormed a
hill overlooking Resaca and the railroad bridge, then beat off attempts
to retake it in fierce fighting that continued until after dark.
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THE CONFEDERATE LINES AT RESACA. (LC)
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THE 5TH INDIANA BATTERY SUPPORTS ROBINSON'S BRIGADE OF HOOKER'S CORPS ON
MAY 14. (FRANK AND MARIE WOOD PRINT COLLECTION)
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Sherman now no longer believed that Johnston intended to retreat.
Even so, his objective remained the same: push the Confederates to the
bank of the Oostanaula, where he hoped to crush them as they tried to
escape across that river. To that end, on the morning of May 15 the
entire XX Corps shifted to the left of the IV Corps with orders to
strike straight down the Dalton-Resaca wagon road, Then, early in the
afternoon, two of its divisions, Major General Daniel Butterfield's and
Brigadier General John Geary's, attacked the Confederate line at a point
where it curved off to the northeast. Despite a determined effort, they
failed to reach, much less breach, the enemy defenses, which were manned
by Major General Thomas C. Hindman's Division of Hood's Corps. They did,
however, overrun a four-gun battery emplaced in front of the hill held
by Hindman's troops—a success that Colonel Benjamin Harrison of the
70th Indiana claimed for his regiment and which would help him,
twenty-four years later, to become president of the United States.
Encouraged by the repulse of the Union assault, Johnston decided to
try again what he attempted yesterday—turn Sherman's left and get
into his rear. On his orders, transmitted through Hood, Stewart's
Division swung around to the northwest before hitting what was thought
to be a still vulnerable Federal flank. But as it did so, Johnston
received word that the "Federal right" was crossing the Oostanaula
several miles southwest of Resaca. At once Johnston directed Hood to
call back Stewart. It was too late. Before Hood's message could reach
him, Stewart attacked. Worse, he ran smack into Williams's XX Corps
division, the one that blasted Stevenson's Division the day before. It
now did the same to Stewart's troops, who lost heavily and gained
nothing.
(click on image for a PDF version)
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BATTLE OF RESACA MAY 15
Hoping to drive Johnston's army back against the Oostanaula, Sherman
ordered Howard's IV Corps and Hooker's XX Corps to attack the
Confederate right wing from the north. The assault failed. After
repulsing the Federals, Johnston directed Hood to have Stewart's
Division make another attempt to turn Sherman's left. He learned that a
strong enemy force had crossed the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry. He sent a
message calling off Stewart's attack, but before it could reach him
Stewart advanced and suffered a bloody repulse from Williams's division
of the XX Corps. During the night Johnston retreated across the
Oostanaula undetected by the Federals.
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The Federal force reported to Johnston as having crossed the
Oostanaula was Brigadier General Thomas Sweeny's division of the XVI
Corps. Sweeny's assignment from Sherman was to put down pontoon bridges
at Lay's Ferry with a view to facilitating the pursuit of Johnston when
he retreated from Resaca. In making it Sherman ignored a suggestion from
Thomas on May 13 merely to feint an attack at Resaca while sending
McPherson's army, bolstered by Hooker's XX Corps, across the Oostanaula
to the hills west of Calhoun, a move that not only would have compelled
Johnston to evacuate Resaca to preserve his supply line but also enabled
McPherson to strike the Confederates with overwhelming force as they
retreated southward.
Nonetheless, the Union bridgehead at Lay's Ferry rendered Resaca
untenable and Johnston realized it. That night his troops stealthily
withdrew from their fortifications and crossed the Oostanaula by means
of a pontoon bridge and the railroad and wagon road bridges. Not until
the Confederate rear guard set fire to the latter two structures shortly
before dawn did the Federals discover that Johnston's army had escaped
to fight another day.
Then and afterward Sherman blamed the failure to bag Johnston at
Resaca on McPherson: he was "overcautious" on May 9. No doubt that is
true. Yet Sherman himself must bear a major share of the responsibility.
Had he adopted Thomas's plan in its original form, or else supplemented
the understrength Army of the Tennessee with a corps from the Army of
the Cumberland, he could have put a force through Snake Creek Gap
capable of blocking Johnston's retreat and compelling him to fight a
battle that almost surely would have led to the destruction of his army.
Likewise, by not acting on Thomas's proposal to send McPherson and
Hooker across the Oostanaula to the hills around Calhoun, Sherman threw
away another opportunity to knock the Confederate army in Georgia out of
the war, an achievement that would have freed his own army to join Grant
in Virginia and crush Lee by sheer weight of numbers.
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CONFEDERATE ATTACK NEAR LAY'S FERRY ON MAY 15. A. R. WAUD ILLUSTRATION
FROM MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA.
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Johnston would forever claim that he was not caught off guard by
Sherman's Snake Creek Gap maneuver and thus never was in danger of being
trapped and smashed north of the Oostanaula, The historical facts
demonstrate otherwise. Only McPherson's loss of nerve and Sherman's
mistakes saved Johnston from total and humiliating defeat at the very
outset of the campaign for Atlanta.
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SOLDIERS FROM HOOKER'S CORPS HAUL A CAPTURED CONFEDERATE CANNON DURING
FIGHT NO ON MAY 15. (FRANK AND MARIE WOOD PRINT COLLECTION)
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THE BATTLEGROUND AT RESACA. (LC)
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