|
THE BUREAU OF COLORED TROOPS
Despite the resistance of many whites, the recruitment of African
Americans into military service proceeded at an almost breathless pace,
which produced a new administrative weight that quickly overwhelmed the
Adjutant General's Office. Queries for information, requests for
appointments to recruit and serve in these new units, mountains of paperwork
for enlistees, and orders to organize and equip these commands began to
suffocate its personnel in an avalanche of documents. To compound these
problems, black regiments required special consideration. The Federal
government placed unusual demands on its officers and men and more
carefully supervised the recruitment process. In the North, state
governments had a hand in the creation of new regiments. Most of the
black units, however, would have ex-slaves as their enlistees, and
they would come predominantly from seceding states. The Federal
government would direct the recruitment of those black units.
By mid-1863, the administrative load became so burdensome that the
War Department decided to create a single entity under the umbrella of
the Adjutant General's Office, called the Bureau of Colored Troops, to manage its
affairs. Headed by Major Charles W. Foster, the bureau was to
systematize the process of raising black units and securing officers for
them. It also served as a clearinghouse of information on these
units.
|
MEMBERS OF THE GUARD OF THE 107TH INFANTRY REGIMENT,
U.S. COLORED TROOPS, AT FORT CORCORAN, WASHINGTON, D.C. (LC)
|
Over the course of the next year, the War Department began to change
the names of black commands. Instead of state designations, they became
United States Colored Troops (USCT), and the various units became United
States Colored Infantry, Artillery, or Cavalry. Of all the black
regiments, only the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, 55th Massachusetts
Infantry, 5th Massachusetts Cavalry, and 29th Connecticut Infantry
retained their original state designations.
With Foster at the helm, the Bureau of Colored Troops administered
more than 186,000 black and white officers and men during the war. At
one time the Bureau of Colored Troops had over 123,000 soldiers in
uniform, a force larger than the field armies that either Lieutenant
General Ulysses S. Grant or Major General William T. Sherman directly
oversaw at the height of their campaigns in 1864 and 1865.
|
THIS ILLUSTRATION FROM HARPER'S WEEKLY SHOWS A
UNION OFFICER TEACHING RECRUITS HOW TO USE THEIR RIFLES.
|
Because of the controversial nature of black military service, the
Lincoln administration determined that whites should officer the new
black regiments. Those black officers in the Native Guards could stay,
although Banks intentionally drove them all out of the army by early
1864. In selected cases, the War Department would permit them to serve
as chaplains and surgeons. Otherwise, African Americans
were barred from the officers' ranks.
By offering commissions to whites, the War Department hoped
to appease objectors in and out of the army. Those whites who
endorsed the concept of black military service and
assisted in its execution could gain commissions or
promotions to higher rank. Individuals who opposed the formation of black regiments received
reassurance that they would not hold commissioned rank over white
enlisted men. In short, whites would remain in charge.
Racial stereotypes, too, played an important role in the decision to
dole out commissions only to whites. Since most white Northerners
doubted that black men had the innate ability to fight well and believed
that their inferior character would prevent them from becoming good
soldiers, these new black regiments would require committed and talented
white officers to train and lead them.
The Federal government decided to screen prospective officers
carefully. Some were individuals whom prominent politicians knew to be
sympathetic toward black people, and they received direct
commissions. But the rapid expansion of black units in the latter
half of 1863 and throughout 1864 and the ensuing demand for white
officers compelled the government to devise more efficient ways of
selecting officers. The problem was that there was no sure-fire method
to determine an individual's capacity for leadership and his attitudes
toward African Americans. The best the government could do was to seek
out moral white men with military knowledge who also had a liberal arts
background, which reflected a more well-rounded individual. By mid-1863,
the Adjutant General's Office established boards to certify the
qualifications of prospective officers.
While many officers in the USCT were political appointees, a majority
passed an examination. This ensured a degree of selectivity and
competence among officers of black units that did not exist in white
regiments. Most officers of white troops obtained their commissions
through political contacts or election by their comrades. They learned
on the job. Nearly all officers in the USCT assumed command with
knowledge of their duties, which unquestionably facilitated the
development of those units.
|
MEMBERS OF COMPANY E OF THE 4TH U.S.
COLORED TROOPS AT FT. LINCOLN. (LC)
|
Some viewed service in the USCT as an extension of their prewar
antislavery activities; others joined because they wanted to uplift the
black race. Some coveted commissions in the USCT exclusively for the
increase in pay and rank. They had no real interest in leading black
soldiers in battle. Many of its officers, after fighting a couple of
years in white units, entered the USCT because they felt this was the
best way they could contribute to the Union war effort. As veterans,
they could teach others what they had learned during active service.
More important than any motive or quality, though, was the fact that
nine of every ten of them had at least some combat experience. They had
"seen the elephant" and knew how to prepare recruits for the hazards
and chaos of a battlefield.
|
|