Greene Monument, 1958 (NPS)

Guilford Courthouse and the Southern Campaign

On March 15, 1781 at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene commanded an army of almost 4,500 American militia and Continental soldiers against a British army of 1,900 veteran regulars commanded by Lord Charles Cornwallis. After two and a half hours of contested fighting, Cornwallis claimed possession of the battlefield, scoring a tactical victory over the Americans. Historians characterize the battle as the “highwater mark of British military operations in the Revolutionary War.”[1] The British victory, however, came with an enormous cost as Cornwallis’ force suffered over 25% casualties. Greene, on the other hand, carefully withdrew his soldiers, abandoning the field in order to preserve the remaining strength of his force. The Battle of Guilford Courthouse marked the apex of the British campaign in the South in 1780 and 1781 (Figure 2). The campaign and the toll it took on Cornwallis’ army set in motion Cornwallis’ decision to march to Yorktown, VA, where, seven months after the Battle at Guilford Courthouse, he surrendered his force to Gen. George Washington.

Figure 2: Map showing the “American Revolution in the South,” National Park Service, undated. Accessed online October 8, 2015: http://battleofcamden.org/nps7881.pdf.

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse is also the culmination of a series of battles, beginning with the Battle of Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780, where the Continental Army and American militia units began to turn the tide of the Revolution against the British Army. Also in October 1780, Gen. George Washington appointed Nathanael Greene to command the Continental Army in the South. Greene employed a new strategy of attrition to frustrate the opposition, in particular Cornwallis, who repeatedly tried to force Greene into a decisive battle. On January 17, 1781, Greene’s subordinate, Gen. Daniel Morgan, decisively defeated a scouting force led by Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton at the Battle of Cowpens. Cornwallis mobilized his army and began to chase Morgan and Greene. Greene led Cornwallis north, evading capture and avoiding pitched battle with the British. Greene’s strategy was to wear down Cornwallis, draw him away from his supply depots, and choose an advantageous time and place to fight.

Greene chose Guilford Courthouse, a rural crossroads in the sparsely settled North Carolina Piedmont to face Cornwallis. To understand the role of the Battle of Guilford Courthouse in the American Revolution, it is necessary to review the broader background of the war and, in particular, the Southern Campaign of 1780 and 1781.

Signers Monument and Grave (NPS)

Overview of the American Revolution

The American Revolution (1775-1783) arose from growing tensions between residents of Great Britain’s thirteen North American colonies and the colonial government, which represented the British crown. In April 1775, skirmishes between British troops and colonial militiamen in the towns of Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts, marked the beginning of the conflict.[2] During the first two years of the American Revolution, most of the fighting occurred in the Northern Colonies. While Gen. George Washington commanded the Continental Army to victory at Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, in late 1776 and early 1777, the British still retained the initiative. However, on October 7, 1777, Patriot forces under the command of Gen. Horatio Gates achieved a significant victory at Saratoga, New York.[3]

By 1780, after almost five years of fighting, the British Army had not defeated Washington’s Continental Army and the British public grew weary of the war. Military strategists, in particular Lord Germain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, promoted a new strategy to mobilize Loyalists in the South and reestablish their authority over the Southern Colonies. These strategists speculated that legions of Southerners would rush to support the British Army, volunteering as soldiers or providing supplies. With this local support, they argued the British Army would end the rebellion in Georgia and the Carolinas.[4] Subsequently, the British Army would invade Virginia and take control of the Chesapeake, where they would establish a base from which to attack Washington’s army from the south.[5]

In May 1780, British forces under Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, recently appointed theater commander over the South, successfully captured Charleston, South Carolina. After only a few days, Clinton departed Charleston to return to the North, confident that by taking the political and economic epicenter of the region, the British Army would enjoy a quick victory over the South. Clinton placed Maj. Gen. Charles Cornwallis in command of the remaining British Army to implement the plan formulated by Germain and others: build loyalist support, establish outposts in the interior of the Carolinas, and defeat the Continental Army. For the next two years, however, the British found themselves in a protracted and increasingly frustrating battle with various militia and Continental Army units.[6]

In July 1780, Cornwallis led his army out of Charleston to invade the interior of South Carolina. On May 29, 1780, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, leading a Legion of cavalry and light infantry, soundly defeated Continental forces under Col. Alexander Buford in the Battle of Waxhaws near the North Carolina border. Stories of Tarleton’s men slaughtering American soldiers spread across the countryside, irreparably damaging the British Army’s reputation amongst Southerners.[7]

In July 1780, Horatio Gates took command of the newly formed Continental Army in the South, replacing Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, who surrendered during the fall of Charleston. Gates led his troops to confront Cornwallis upon learning that the British Army had moved towards Camden, South Carolina. Gates called upon local militias and irregular soldiers to join his force and make a stand against the British. Several South Carolina militia leaders, including Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, were among those to arrive in support. In August 1780, Gates’ Army outnumbered Cornwallis’, but Gates made strategic mistakes like positioning untested militia brigades directly across from the strength of Cornwallis’s line. The charging British regulars routed the milita on the American flank, resulting in a devastating defeat for Gates and the Continental Army.[8]

Several local militia leaders, in particular Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Andrew Pickens, left Gates’ command and independently pursued hit-and-run campaigns against the British for the rest of the year. Avoiding a full-scale battle, these militia leaders carried on harassment attacks that took advantage of their mobility and of their superior knowledge of the local terrain. The successful campaigns of Marion, Sumter, and Pickens demonstrated to subsequent Continental Army commanders a new way to challenge the British Army and galvanized popular support for the American forces.[9]

After the victory at Camden, with the encouragement of British military leaders who wanted Cornwallis to extend the campaign into North Carolina, Cornwallis sent a force led by Maj. Patrick Ferguson toward Charlotte, North Carolina. As word of Ferguson’s presence and harsh treatment of local residents circulated across the countryside, backcountry insurgents moved into the area to confront the British expedition. On October 6, 1780, Ferguson moved his men into a defensive position at the top of King’s Mountain and prepared for battle. Over 3,000 mountaineers and irregular units charged, overwhelming the British forces. Ferguson, the only British officer present at the battle, was killed and his command was soundly defeated.[10]

The defeat at King’s Mountain temporarily slowed Cornwallis’ advance into North Carolina. Accordingly, Cornwallis returned the main section of his army to Winnsboro, South Carolina, to reorganize and resupply. In doing so, he left behind a series of supply outposts in South Carolina stretching from Ninety-Six in the west to Georgetown in the east.

Alamnnce/Colonial/Hunter Monument (NPS)

The Southern Campaign: From Cowpens to Guilford Courthouse

After the defeat at Camden, commanding Gen. George Washington appointed Nathanael Greene to be the Maj. Gen. in command of the Southern Army. In his letter to the Continental Congress, Washington wrote of Greene, “in whose abilities, fortitude, and integrity from a long and intimate experience of them, I have the most entire confidence.”However, Washington had little advice to give Greene on his new command. As he wrote on October 22, 1780, “Uninformed as I am of the enemy’s force in that quarter, or our own, or of the resources which it will be in our power to command for carrying on the war, I can give you no particular instructions but must leave you to govern yourself entirely, according to your own prudence and judgment and the circumstance in which you find yourself... .”[11]

When Greene arrived in Charlotte, NC in December 1780, the army under his command consisted of 1,500 soldiers, including only 950 regular troops. Greene chose to move quickly to gain the initiative against Cornwallis rather than establishing winter quarters as planned for by his predecessor Gen. Gates. Greene recognized that the Southern Campaign would be different from the war in the North, where Washington hoped to defeat the British in a decisive battle. Greene decided to play to his troop’s strengths, utilize better knowledge of local terrain, and employ guerrilla tactics to counter the British superiority in experience and resources. Greene also wanted to draw Cornwallis deeper into the Carolinas, removing him from his main supply depots on the coast.[12]

Greene divided his force. He sent Daniel Morgan to threaten the British garrison at Ninety-Six, South Carolina. Cornwallis, learning of the movement, decided to attack Morgan first before confronting Greene’s main army. Cornwallis sent Tarleton towards Ninety-Six and Morgan. Tarleton chased Morgan, who led the British Legion commander towards Cowpens, South Carolina. Morgan chose to confront Tarleton on terrain of his selection, were he determined his men would have an advantage. Morgan’s troops arrived on the field a day earlier than Tarleton. They rested, ate, and prepared for battle. Morgan positioned his men in three successive lines of progressive strength, beginning with militia units and concluding with his most trusted, battle-tested Continental units. Tarleton’s troops, tired from a long, forced march, attacked Morgan’s men at dawn on January 17, 1781. Tarleton made a frontal assault up a long, gentle incline into the face of the American defense. Morgan had instructed the militiamen to fire two volleys into the advancing British line and then fall back. Morgan wanted the successive lines to soften up the British and Tarleton’s aggressive charge fell into Morgan’s trap. The first and second lines fired their volleys and then withdrew to support the third line. The British misinterpreted the Americans’ movements, believing they were retreating. They ran headlong into Morgan’s third line of fresh regulars. Morgan defeated Tarleton, inflicting tremendous damage to the British force. Tarleton’s losses were: 110 dead, over 200 wounded, and 500 captured. Morgan had only 12 killed and 60 wounded.[13]

Cornwallis immediately tried to catch Morgan after the battle, but could not before Morgan had rejoined Greene’s main force. After Cowpens, Cornwallis plunged into North Carolina sending his army in pursuit of Greene and Morgan. Greene purposefully led Cornwallis into a month-long chase across North Carolina. Morgan placed boats in advance of his troops to transport his men across rivers. Cornwallis could not keep pace so at Ramsour Mill, Cornwallis burned his baggage trains in an effort to increase his speed. As a result, Cornwallis and the British Army had to depend upon local residents for supplies or result to plundering for supplies. When Loyalist support was not forthcoming, Cornwallis’ army did in fact pillage local farms, further alienating local residents and driving more to support Greene and the Americans.[14]

On January 19, 1781, Cornwallis marched north in pursuit of Greene, following intelligence gathered by patrols sent out under Tarleton’s command. The reports from Tarleton “induced Earl Cornwallis to cross Buffaloe creek and Little Broad river, in hopes of intercepting Gen. Morgan.” Tarleton explained, “Great exertions were made by part of the army, without baggage, to retake our prisoners, and to intercept Gen. Morgan’s corps on its retreat to the Catawba; but the celerity of their movements, and the swelling of numberless creeks in our way, rendered all our efforts fruitless.”[15]

The British discovered that Morgan had crossed the Catawba River at Sherrald’s Ford, while sending some troops and prisoners farther north to cross at Island Ford. Morgan pushed northward, keeping the swollen river between himself and his British pursuers. After having spent several days readying his regiments, Cornwallis’s army marched on January 28 and then encamped near Beattie’s Ford. At this time, the Catawba was nearly impassible due to rising waters. Meanwhile, Morgan had been “collecting the Militia” and “filling all the Private fords to Make them Impassable.”[16] He also dispatched Brig. Gen. William Lee Davidson, a former Continental officer, with North Carolina militiamen to Beattie’s Ford.

While Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene left his Continental units along the Pee Dee River under Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger, with orders to march north to Salisbury, Greene himself set out on January 28 with a guide and three dragoons on a long journey across south central North Carolina to Beattie’s Ford.[17] After reaching Morgan on January 30, Greene held a council of war at Beattie’s Ford with Morgan, Davidson, and cavalryman Lt. Col. William Washington. According to Greene’s plan, Morgan’s men were to hold Sherrald’s Ford while Davidson and his militia held the lower fords as long as possible and then fall back to Salisbury, a major manufacturing and supply center for the southern Continental army.[18]

As Greene met with his war council, Cornwallis sent a feint led by Lt. Col. James Webster and the 33rd Foot toward Beattie’s Ford and then marched to a smaller crossing four miles south, known as Cowan’s Ford. On February 1, a battle ensued in which a local Tory killed Brig. Gen. William Lee Davidson. After the battle, Cornwallis moved the majority of his army across Cowan’s Ford, while Davidson’s remaining men fled Beattie’s Ford. Once the British forced the crossing at Cowan’s, the Continentals moved rapidly, marching toward Salisbury by a more northerly route. Seemingly unaware that the Continentals had fallen back to Salisbury, Cornwallis dispatched Tarleton with the 23rd Foot and his legion dragoons to search for Greene.[19] On February 2, Greene evacuated Salisbury after loading wagons with food, ammunition, and weapons. Greene ordered the militia towards Trading Ford on the Yadkin River. The next day, Greene and Morgan rode to Trading Ford and watched the army cross while the river rose rapidly from the rain. Greene and Morgan were running out of time as Cornwallis was behind them by only a day’s march.[20]

On February 2, the British marched for Salisbury where they pillaged food and supplies left by Greene’s army. The following night, the British vanguard led by Brig. Gen. O’Hara reached Trading Ford. As elevated water levels prevented Cornwallis from using the Trading Ford, he followed the Yadkin River upstream to the Shallow Ford, passing through the Moravian communities of Bethania, Bethabara, and Salem.[21] After reaching Salem, Cornwallis was in an excellent position to place his forces between Greene’s army and the Dan River, the next major watercourse before the Virginia line.[22]

Meanwhile, Greene had marched for Guilford Courthouse with his Continentals, which they reached by February 7. At Guilford, he met with Morgan and was soon joined by Huger and Lt. Col. Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee, who had traveled from Cheraw, South Carolina.[23] Huger and Lee camped “in the woods a few hundred yards in the rear of the courthouse,” along the Reedy Fork Road.[24] On February 9, Greene called a meeting of his principal commanders where they planned a rapid withdrawal to the Dan River after noting their terrible strategic position. Greene thus planned to avoid battle, draw the British as far as possible from their base, and retire into Virginia to resupply, if necessary.[25]

To prevent Greene from escaping, Cornwallis continued the pursuit, which developed into a race for the river fords.[26] The Dan River was deep and only could be crossed on its upper reaches. Accordingly, Cornwallis interposed his army between Greene and these fords, hoping that he might compel the Southern Army to fight. Greene, however, had prepared for such a contingency and had ordered the construction and collection of boats on the south bank of the Dan, which enabled his men to cross to the north side of the river by February 19. After having “pursued Greene’s army for three weeks, covering some 250 miles over muddy, frost-encrusted roads, in torrents of rain and sleet, crossed several major waterways and fought many skirmishes,” Cornwallis had lost the Race to the Dan.[27]

With Greene and his army on the north bank of the Dan River, Cornwallis marched to Hillsborough, North Carolina. After arriving there on February 20, Cornwallis raised the Royal Standard and called upon all loyal subjects to rally to his assistance. The results were disappointing, however, and so in a few days they were marching again.[28] Cornwallis moved west of Hillsborough, mostly in search of provisions, and established camp on the south side of Alamance Creek between the Haw and Deep Rivers. Cornwallis troops began to suffer from the Army’s inability to support itself and to find assistance from Loyalists. Sergeant Roger Lamb wrote, “Such was the scarcity of provisions at Hillsborough, that it was impossible to support the army in that place.”[29]

In the meantime, Greene collected reinforcements and rested his army in Halifax County, Virginia. Greene’s main objective was to wear down Cornwallis with piecemeal partisan hit-and run tactics, holding him as far from his supply base as possible, while simultaneously working to keep Tory recruitment at minimal levels.[30] On February 22, Greene crossed back to the south bank of the Dan and remained on the move until the last of the summoned militia reinforcements could join him.

Detachments from both Armies met in a series of small-unit skirmishes across the Piedmont: Pyle’s Defeat, Clapp’s Mill, and Weitzel’s Mill. These smaller actions presaged the larger battle a few days later at Guilford Courthouse. In the days leading to Guilford, the soldiers fought in thick woods, across farm fields, and through undulating terrain cut by meandering streams. Additionally, Greene continuously added to his knowledge of local roads and rivers near Guilford Courthouse, developing avenues of access and egress he would use during the subsequent battle.

Greene sent a force under Lt. Col. Henry Lee to intercept a group of Loyalists, under the command of Col. John Pyle, that were marching to join Cornwallis. Coming across two of Pyle’s advance riders who mistook Greene’s force as the British Army, Lee learned of Pyle’s location and surprised the Loyalist force. The skirmish resulted in one hundred Loyalist casualties.[31]

Units from Cornwallis’ and Greene’s armies met again on March 2, 1781 at Clapp’s Mill (also called the Battle of Alamance.) Cornwallis, who had departed Hillsborough on February 27, stationed his troops on the south bank of Alamance Creek. Greene moved a portion of his troops a few miles from the British on the opposite bank, while the main body of Greene’s army remained several miles away encamped at the Speedwell Ironworks. Clapp’s Mill was a settlement of German farmers, with an assortment of farm buildings and open fields. Detachments from the two armies clashed in the fields surrounding Barney Clapp’s farm, leaving three Americans dead and 21 British soldiers dead or wounded.[32]

Cornwallis continued his effort to engage Greene in direct conflict. He moved his army toward the Americans near Weitzel’s Mill. The Americans’ intercepted a British scouting party and the two forces engaged in a running fight along the road to the mill. The Americans lost approximately twelve soldiers and the British losses numbered about 25. The Americans pulled back and retreated towards Guilford Courthouse. Local militia units and the troops retreating from Weitzel’s Mill joined Greene’s main army as it marched on March 12th toward Guilford Courthouse.[33]

Davidson and Nash Arches (NPS)

The Battle of Guilford Courthouse, March 15, 1781

Pre-Battle Positioning of Greene’s Army

The skirmishes occurring before the Battle of Guilford Courthouse enabled Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene time to organize and deploy his army in the dense woods west of the courthouse. The terrain and the sheer size of Greene’s force contributed to his use of a three-line formation, similar to the strategy Sumter successfully employed at Cowpens. Greene positioned two militia lines, one North Carolina and the other Virginia, supported by a third line comprised of his Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia Continentals. In addition, Greene placed riflemen and light troops on each flank while Dragoons covered the extreme flanks. Greene also placed his artillery in two locations: one at the center of the first line and the other near the center of the third line.[34]

Greene’s first line of militia consisted of the two North Carolina brigades. North of the Great Salisbury Road, Greene placed Brig. Gen. Thomas Eaton’s Halifax District brigade, consisting of approximately 500-600 men. South of the Great Salisbury Road that bisected the battlefield, Greene placed Brig. Gen. John Butler’s Hillsborough District brigade, consisting similarly of 500-600 men. Next to Butler, Col. William Moore commanded the Caswell County militia facing west from behind a rail fence.[35]

South of the Caswell County troops, Butler placed the Granville County militia, led by Col. Joseph Taylor. To the left of Taylor’s regiment, Col. Thomas Farmer and Col. John Taylor commanded two Orange County militia regiments, including a small detachment of Wake County men. A third, smaller detachment led by Col. Robert Mebane may have also been present. To their left were small contingents, probably platoon-size formations numbering about twenty-five men each, from Rockingham, Randolph, and Chatham Counties. Further south, Butler posted the Rowan, Mecklenburg, and Guilford militias of which most of the men hid in woods while some stood behind the rail fence that ran the length of the fields to their north.[36]

In the center of this first line, Greene placed two six-pounder field pieces commanded by Capt. Anthony Singleton of the 1st Continental Artillery along the Great Salisbury Road. He positioned a company of at least 40 North Carolina Continentals at the most exposed position on the first line, behind and on the flanks of Singleton’s artillery.[37]

Records indicate that on the north flank of the first line, Greene posted Col. Charles Lynch’s Virginia riflemen, Capt. Robert Kirkwood’s Delaware company, Capt. Phillip Huffman’s Virginia company, Lt. Col. William Washington’s Continental dragoons, and at least two mounted companies of militia dragoons. Archaeologist Lawrence E. Babits and research historian Joshua B. Howard, however, suggest that Lt. Col. William Washington’s Continental dragoons probably were not on this flank because of heavy brush and the lack of any pathways adequate for horsemen. Instead, they may have been in the open space north of the courthouse where the army had camped in early February.[38]

The second line was three hundred to 350 yards behind the first line. Greene anchored the southern flank with William Campbell’s Virginia riflemen, Joseph Winston’s Surry and Wilkes County, North Carolina, riflemen, in addition to Lee’s Legion dragoons and infantry. Greene posted the Virginia militia to the east of (behind) the North Carolinians in a dense tangle of underbrush and woods. North of Great Salisbury Road, Greene positioned Brig. Gen. Robert Lawson’s brigade of Virginians, comprised of men from the central and eastern part of the state. Lawson assigned Col. Beverley Randolph’s regiment, consisting of men from Powhatan, Amelia and Cumberland Counties, to the brigade’s northern (right) flank. South of Randolph stood Col. John Holcombe’s regiment, which included men from Amelia, Charlotte, Mecklenburg, and Powhatan Counties. The smallest regiment in Lawson’s brigade, consisting of only a few companies from Mecklenburg, Powhatan, and Brunswick Counties, held the position closest to the road.[39]

Brig. Gen. Edward Steven’s brigade, mostly consisting of men from the lower Shenandoah Valley, stood south of Great Salisbury Road. Closest to the road and south of Skipwith’s men, Stevens placed Col. Peter Perkins’s Pittsylvania County regiment. South of Perkins’s men, Stevens placed Col. Nathaniel Cocke’s regiment, most of which came from Lunenburg County but also included companies from Halifax County and Prince Edward. South of Cocke’s men, Stevens positioned Col. George Moffett’s Augusta County regiment. The southernmost unit of Seven’s brigade was the regiment from Rockbridge and Augusta Counties under Col. Samuel McDowell.[40]

One of McDowell’s men, Samuel Houston, provided a statement that described the tree cover along the second line and its effect on the course of the battle. Houston stated, “When we marched near the ground we charged our guns. Presently our brigade major came, ordering us to take trees as we pleased. The men run to choose their trees, but with difficulty, many crowding to one, and some far behind others. Presently the Augusta men, and some of Col. Campbell’s men fell in at right angles to us.”[41] Houston’s account suggests that the tree cover south of the road may have been less thick than McDowell’s position. It also indicates that during the battle the Virginia militia fought more as skirmishers rather than in a linear formation.[42]

Greene posted his third line more than 500 yards to the east, behind the Virginians. The line consisted of Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia Continentals under Col. Otho Holland Williams and Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger. Greene and his staff sat on their horses behind the third line near the courthouse, 60 yards to the rear of the 1st Maryland. Col. John Gunby and Lt. Col. John Eager Howard led the 1st Maryland, which Greene had posted in a copse of woods on the slopes of the slight ridge in the center of the Continental line.[43] Greene posted the 2nd Maryland, led by Lt. Col. Benjamin Ford, closest to the Great Salisbury Road with its left flank turned at a right angle from the crest of the ridge to the roadbed.[44]

Brig. Gen. Isaac Huger led the Virginia brigade, which consisted of the 1st and 2nd Virginia Regiments of 1781. Greene positioned them furthest north of the road, hidden in the woods along the west-facing slope. Since the vale bulges east at this point, they were well to the rear of the 1st Maryland’s axis. Facing northwest along the slope bordering the southern edge of the vale’s eastern extension, Greene placed the 2nd Virginia between the 1st Virginia and the 1st Maryland.[45]

Between the Virginia regiments, Greene positioned his second section of artillery. Capt. Lt. Ebenezer Finley commanded these two six-pounders along with two lieutenants and 26 enlisted men. Several smaller militia units, most of them light horse, waited near Guilford Courthouse behind the third line. Another mounted detachment of about 100 men, under Col. Francois Lellorquis, the Marquis de Malmedy, and Baron de Gloeback, eventually formed north of the courthouse although they did not arrive in time for the fight. Pension accounts also suggest that supplied at least two light horse companies from Guilford County, commanded by Captains Thomas Cook and Daniel Gillespie, were nearby but did not participate in the battle.[46]

Greene had his men, which totaled over 4,000, positioned in the field by 11:00 A.M. on March 15, 1781. Green then rode up and down the first line and gave a speech imploring the militia to “fire two volleys and then retire.”[47] Shortly afterwards Greene rode to the third line. Soon after Greene’s departure, Lee arrived with his men and, likely unaware of Greene’s oratory, gave his own speech to the North Carolinians on the first line. Subsequently, Lee and his men rode to their position on the south flank, suggesting that there was possibly a lane, or path, connecting the first line to the flank.[48]

Around 1:30 PM, the North Carolina Militia spotted British soldiers 400 yards to their west. The citizen soldiers watched anxiously as a long column of British soldiers advanced down the descent and across a small creek toward Joseph Hoskins’s house. Cornwallis had arrived.[49]

Advancement of the British Army

Soon after discovering Greene’s troops blocking Great Salisbury Road, Cornwallis situated his forces and readied his men for battle. He ordered Leslie, Webster, and O’Hara to advance and deploy their men into a line extending north and south of the road. As the units crossed Horsepen Creek, they moved into the woods about a hundred yards west of Joseph Hoskins’s farmstead.[50]

As these first British troops found their positions, they faced a bombardment of solid shot fired by Anthony Singleton’s artillery, which had advanced several yards in front of the North Carolina militia line. However, the dense woods adjacent to the road prevented Singleton’s blasts from fully reaching the British regiments.[51] Responding to the American artillery fire, Cornwallis ordered Lieutenants McLeod, Smith, and O’Hara to advance their pieces to the front and return fire. While the artillery duel lasted at least twenty minute, both sides suffered only minor casualties. Subsequently, the Americans withdrew their guns, as there is no evidence suggesting their active participation when the British attacked the first line.[52]

While under bombardment, Cornwallis situated Webster’s brigade north of the road, with the 33rd Foot holding the left flank and the 23rd Foot the right. South of the road stood the 71st Highlanders and the Von Bose Regiment.[53] To support the main line, Cornwallis positioned the Guards Grenadiers and the 2nd Guards Battalion across the road, centered behind the 23rd and 71st. Farther south, he placed the 1st Guards Battalion to support Maj. Gen. Leslie and the right wing. North of the road, Cornwallis stationed the jaegers and the Guards light infantry behind the 2nd Guards. Across the lane from them, Tarleton’s British Legion and the 17th Light Dragoons stood in reserve.[54]

In an after-action report, Cornwallis explained his plan: “The woods on our right and left were reported to be impracticable for cannon; but as that on our right appeared more open, I resolved to attack the left wing of the enemy.”[55] Presumably, Cornwallis was referring to a second smaller open field in front of the American left flank, although his statement may reflect that the woods south of the road were less dense than the woods on the north side.[56] Shortly after noon, the British army advanced through the dense underbrush and woods toward Greene’s first line. Johann Du Buy commented, “As the whole country is covered with woods and forests, it was impossible to see the enemy, much less their position.”[57]

Within minutes of advancing, the 23rd and 71st entered an open field “wet and muddy from the rains which had recently fallen,” roughly 400 yards from the North Carolina militia line on the other side of a rail fence.[58] The British regiments soon realized they would have to cross two fence lines before reaching the Americans. The first fence was located on the western edge of the field and the second was roughly 200 yards in front of the American line north of the road and 150-175 yards of the Americans positioned south of the road.[59] After the British crossed the open field north of the road, the attack on the American first line began.

The First Line

As the British came into view, the North Carolina militiamen holding the first line prepared for the assault.[60] British Captain Thomas Saumarex noted the conditions of the battlefield, “The Royal Welsh Fusiliers had to attack the enemy in front, under every disadvantage, having to march over a field lately ploughed, which was wet and muddy from the rains which had recently fallen. The regiment marched to the attack under a most galling and destructive fire, which it could only return by an occasional volley.”[61]

According to Babits and Lawrence, the British 23rd and 71st marched forward, leaving both of their flanks temporarily exposed because the 33rd to the north and the Von Bose to the south fell behind as they moved through more densely wooded areas.[62] The 71st marched across the open field before reaching the midfield fence. At this point, the Highlanders crossed the fence, reformed their ranks, and resumed moving forward. To their right, the Hessians were moving southeast into position and extending their line.

Von Bose’s commanding officer, Maj. Johann Du Buy, stated that as the men following Von Bose moved through the woods, they found “a deep ravine in front of us with high banks filled with water. We crossed it with much difficulty and then came to a fenced-in wheat field, on the other side of which was the enemy consisting of about 1,000 Continental troops and militia en ligne. We tore down most of the fences on our side and jumped over the others without, however, being inconvenienced by the enemy, although they were not more than 300 yards distant. I formed the battalion into line with the utmost dispatch and ran to meet the enemy in tolerable order.”[63] This “deep ravine,” according to Babits and Howard, was likely the lower, western end of a watercourse that today crosses the Hoskins Farm site. The leftmost companies of the Von Bose regiment entered the southernmost field about 220 yards west of the Americans holding the first line. William Campbell, leading the Virginia riflemen on the southern flank, recalled that the British “immediately advanced upon our Troops, upon which the firing of small Arms began.”[64]

According to reports from Greene, Tarleton, and Lee, the American militia first fired when the British crossed the middle fence lines, approximately 140-150 yards away from the American position. Accounts by those British and Americans actually engaged at the first line suggest the main volley came later, when the British were closer to the first line, some accounts suggesting the distance was only 35-50 yards.

Campbell’s Virginia riflemen, posted on the ridgeline just beyond the southern edge of the field and riflemen positioned on the first line’s southern end, likely engaged the British first, peppering them with shot as the British soldiers advanced toward the first line. The first line of American militia waited until the British got within “killing distance” for their less accurate muskets.[65]

Having crossed the middle fences, the British north of the road advanced on the American line. The 23rd moved forward, leaving their left flank exposed to enemy fire. When the Welch Fusiliers came within range of the North Carolinian’s muskets, the veteran redcoats broke into a run charging toward the inexperienced Americans.[66]

The North Carolina militia fired. British Capt. Thomas Saumarez reported the 23rd received “a most galling and destructive fire.”[67] To the 23rd’s right, the 71st crossed 150 yards of open field before they too came under fire. Granville County militiaman John Watkins wrote that along the left of the American line “orders were given not to fire until the Enemy passed two dead trees standing in the field through which they was to approach us, about 100 yards from the fence.”[68]

The Hessians marching on the 71st right also suffered. Hessian sergeant Koch explained: “About 100 yards from the enemy line, they delivered a general fire and 180 men of our von Bose Regiment immediately fell.”[69] The British and Hessians regrouped and returned fire. On the left end of the British line, the 33rd probably did not fire at the American first line because their approach took them through deep woods. They continued to march north towards Lynch’s Bedford County riflemen and the Continental infantry under Capt. Robert Kirkwood and Lt. Philip Huffman.[70]

The North Carolina militia broke ranks as the British and Hessian soldiers charged with fixed bayonets. Wetwood Armistead’s stated that his entire company fled in the face of the assault. Many of the men fell to the rear, behind Lawson’s and Stevens’s brigades who formed the second American line. The Virginians had received orders to let the North Carolinians pass through so they could reorganize with the third line near the courthouse. Other militiamen made their way to the northern and southern flanks and disappeared into the woods beyond, as the British “charged with such impetuosity as to cause them to retreat.”[71]

As the 23rd and 71st broke through the North Carolina center, the 33rd and Von Bose, on either side of the center thrust, attacked Kirkwood and Lynch on the northern flank and Campbell, Winston, and Lee on the southern. As these units moved forward, they separated from the units in the center. As the 33rd advanced to the northeast, the 23rd tried to hold the line together by moving north. As a result, the British center developed a gap. In response, Brig. Gen. O’Hara led the 2nd Battalion of Guards under James Stuart and the Guards Grenadier Company into the space. Cornwallis also sent the light infantry of the Guards and the Jägers into the woods to support the 33rd on the left. O’Hara advanced the 1st Battalion of Guards to cover the Hessians’right. Greene’s first line had extended the British battle line and forced Cornwallis to deploy his reserves early in the battle.[72]

From the beginning of the battle, Lynch’s Bedford riflemen north of the road, and Campbell’s and Winston’s riflemen on the southern flank fired at the advancing British. The battlefield on the left flank of the British, in front of the 33rd was thick with trees. John Larkin, a Guilford County man who served alongside Kirkwood’s men said that the men were not in traditional battle line, but spread out behind trees. Shortly after the North Carolina militia line collapsed, Kirkwood and Lynch began to withdraw to the east towards the second line, drawing the British forward.[73]

The Second Line

The Virginians posted along the second line could not see the advancing British army but could hear the battle raging and see the North Carolina militia regiments falling back. There was approximately 400 yards between the first and second lines of Greene’s army. North of Great Salisbury Road, on the British left, the 33rd moved through the woods following a stream as they tried to remain connected to the 23rd on their right. The 23rd crossed open fields under fire from the opposing Virginia riflemen. Once they had reached the top of the slope in their front, the 33rd turned east and began driving towards the American right flank. By the time they passed the now abandoned first line, the light infantry and the Jägers were in position to protect the 33rd’s left flank. Pushing forward, the 33rd drove back the right end of American second line.[74] North of the road, Lawson ordered Randolph’s and Holcombe’s Virginia regiments forward when the British troops came into view.

As Randolph’s and Holcombe’s regiments met the 23rd, the Guards Grenadiers and the 2nd Guards Battalion, sent to fill the gap during the British assault on the first line, arrived. The Guards Grenadier angled north and struck Holcombe’s left flank. The battle for the second line’s northern half rapidly dissolved into a series of sharp skirmishes as small squads and platoons of Virginians and British infantrymen fought hand to hand in the woods.[75] The British eventually gained the advantage and pushed the middle of the American right flank backwards.

Around this time, according to participant accounts, Cornwallis appeared near the front to lead the attack. Seargent Lamb recalled:

“I saw Lord Cornwallis riding across the clear ground. His lordship was mounted on a dragoon’s horse (his own having been shot), the saddlebags were under the creature’s belly, which much retarded his progress, owing to the vast quantity of Underwood that was spread over the ground; his lordship was evidently unconscious of the danger. I immediately laid hold of the bridle of his horse, and turned his head. I then mentioned to him, that if his lordship pursued in the same direction, he would in a few moments be surrounded by the enemy, and, perhaps cut to pieces or captured. I continued to run along the side of the horse, keeping the bridle in my hand, until his lordship, gained the 23rd regiment, which was at that time drawn up in the skirt of the woods.”[76]

South of Great Salisbury Road, the British advanced much more slowly. The 2nd Guards Battalion along either side of the road attacked the Virginians under Brig. Gen. Edward Stevens. Here, the battle also dissolved into separate skirmishes and close quarters fighting. During the fighting, Brig. Gen. Stevens fell wounded after receiving a shot through the thigh. He ordered a retreat and the right half of his command immediately fell back towards the rear. The southern portion of Steven’s troops, under Maj. Alexander Stuart, stood their ground because they had yet been attacked.

According to Babits, the fractured character of the battle line was a result of Greene’s strategy and the nature of the battlefield. Greene’s of using multiple lines had broken the British line as different units advanced at different rates. Also, British troops may have followed paths across the undulating terrain, resulting in an indirect march across the battlefield.

On the right, Von Bose and the 1st Guards attacked the American southern flank, formed by troops under Col. William Campbell, Captain, Andrew Wallace, and Lt. Col. Henry Lee. “Light Horse” Lee withdrew to the southeast. The 1st Guards on the far right of the British line followed Lee becoming separated from the rest of their line. Stuart’s men, having thus far avoided active battle, attacked the unprotected left flank of the British. Lee and Campbell also turned and attacked the now vulnerable Guards. The combined Continental troops inflicted significant casualties, but a group of Hessian troops arrived in time to prevent total destruction of the 1st Guards. The Hessians drove the Virginians back, at which point the American’s withdrew. The Hessian did capture a few Virginians, but most escaped towards the third line near the courthouse.

The British troops were now spread out across the line of battle, fighting separate, disconnected skirmishes with the Americans. They succeeded pushing much of the second line backwards, but at the expense of ammunition, men, and energy. As they renewed the advance, Greene’s third line of fresh Continental infantry waited.

The Third Line

Greene placed his final line of tested Continental soldiers approximately 8 00 yards behind the second line. While they reportedly could not see the action, the waiting troops could hear the battle approaching them.

Lt. Col. John Eager Howard wrote that “the first [Maryland] regiment under Gunby was formed in a hollow, in the wood, and to the right [west] of the cleared ground about the Court house. The Virginia Brigade under Genl. Huger were to our right. The second [Maryland] regiment was at some distance to the left of the first, in the cleared ground, with its left flank thrown back so as to form a line almost at right angles [to the] 1st regt.” Babits explains that the 2nd Maryland was largely south of Great Salisbury Road with a few units on the north side. He also suggests that there was a gap between the two Maryland battalions. Huger, presumably, occupied the line between the road and the edge of the ridge overlooking the valley between the second and third lines. The land on this portion of the battlefield fell away into a densely wooded gully in front of the Americans. On the Great Salisbury Road, between the two divisions, Greene posted the surviving North Carolina Continentals and Singleton’s two six-pound cannon.[77]

Lt. Col. Samuel Hawes’s Virginia Continentals occupied the line to the right of the 1st Maryland. In front of these two regiments, Captain Lt. Ebenezer Finley had two six-pound cannon positioned on the terrace overlooking the valley ready to fire upon a British advance. Beyond, Col. John Greene’s Virginia regiment occupied a wooded slope on the edge of the valley. On the far right of the American Line, Col. Charles Lynch and Capt. Robert Kirkwood had their regiments in line. Many of the Virginia militiamen joined one of these regiments after they withdrew from the second line.[78]

The 33rd Foot, the Jägers, and the 2nd Battalion of Guards approached the northernmost right flank of the American third line opposite Lynch and Kirkwood. The 33rd arrived first and immediately attacked. Continental fire drove them back and the 33rd withdrew to a high point across the vale opposite the Americans. The 2nd Guards attacked next in the direction of the 2nd Maryland. The Marylanders, because they were in position along the road, were exposed to British artillery fire. According to Cornwallis, “The second battalion of Guards first gained the clear ground near Guilford Court-house, and found a corps of Continental infantry, much superior in number, formed in the open field of the left [north] of the road.”[79] The 2nd Maryland tried to move its line to meet the British marching from the west. The 2nd Guards, coming across the valley in front of the third line, re-formed their battle-line, fired a series of volleys, then charged. The 2nd Guards dislodged the 2nd Maryland and captured Singleton’s cannon near Great Salisbury Road.[80] The 1st Maryland led a counter attack against the Guards whose advance had exposed their left flank. North Carolina militiaman Nathaniel Slade described the scene, “this conflict between the brigade of Guards and the first regiment of Marylanders was most terrific, for they fired at the same instant, and they appeared so near that the blazes from their guns seem to meet.”[81] Washington’s 3rd Continental light dragoons then attacked the Guards from the rear. Cornwallis, who witnessed the counter attack, recalled that the 2nd Guards Battalion was “immediately charged and driven back into the field by Col. Washington’s dragoons, with the loss of the 6-pounders they had taken.”[82] Having taken substantial casualties, the Guards fell back.

As the 1st Maryland moved back towards the courthouse to reform their line, several British regiments appeared in the valley below them. At this point, Greene ordered a withdrawal to save his army. Greene wrote after the battle that “they having broken the 2d Maryland Regiment, and turned our left flank, got into the rear of the Virginia brigade; and appearing to be gaining on our right, which would have encircled the whole of the Continental troops, I thought it most advisable to order a retreat.”[83] Green’s Virginia regiment covered the withdrawal. Soon, the remaining British regiments arrived to pursue the withdrawing Continentals but the Virginians successfully harassed the exhausted British enough that they broke off the chase. According to Otho Holland Williams, “the enemy did not presume to press our rear with any spirit they followed only three miles where the regular troops halted and a great many of the milita formed.”[84]

Greene led his troops away from the battle along Reedy Fork to the predetermined meeting location at Speedwell Ironworks on Troublesome Creek. He had sent his army’s baggage and supply wagons there prior to the battle. Lee’s dragoons escaped the battle along Great Salisbury Road and rejoined Greene later. Greene ordered his commissaries to distribute two days’ rations and a gill of rum to each soldier. The British stayed on the battlefield near the courthouse, camping that night surrounded by the dead and wounded. A cold rain fell on the British troops. They had little food and the rain prevented fires to warm them on a cold night. According to Babits, “The men had last eaten at 4:00P.M. on 14 March, consuming the last of their four ounces of beef and four ounces of bread per man. Since then they had marked nearly fifteen miles, fought several intense skirmishes, and engaged in a major battle.[85]

On March 18, Cornwallis departed Guilford Courthouse, marching his troops south to New Garden. For two days, he allowed his troops to rest at the Quaker village. He then headed east looking to find “some place for rest and refitment.”[86] Eventually, Cornwallis withdrew all the way to Wilmington, where he had lines of communication with Clinton, in the North, and the garrison in Charleston.

The Battle at Guilford Courthouse was technically a tactical victory for the British who drove the Continentals off the battlefield. They captured 1,300 small arms, four American six-pounders, two ammunition wagons, and other helpful supplies. The Americans, however, extracted a price for Cornwallis’ nominal victory. Of the 1,934 men Cornwallis led into battle that morning, the British reported 93 killed, 413 wounded and 26 missing. Greene officially had 4,400 men at Guilford, though not all saw action. The battle cost the Americans: 79 killed, 184 wounded, and 1,046 missing. Of the 1,046 missing, 885 were militia.[87]

After the Battle of Guilford Courthouse

The Southern Army under Greene stayed in the region after Guilford Courthouse, making regular attacks on remaining British outposts. Greene reported, “I am determined to carry the War immediately into South Carolina.”[88] Greene’s men attacked garrisons at Hobkirk’s Hill, Ninety-Six, and Eutaw Springs, forcing the British to withdraw their soldiers towards the coast to more secure garrisons. Except for Charleston and Wilmington, Greene effectively controlled the interior of South and North Carolina.

In April 1781, Cornwallis departed Wilmington and marched his army north towards the Virginia and the Chesapeake. He met some resistance along the way, fighting minor skirmishes with North Carolina militia units. He positioned his Army on the peninsula between the York and James River, near Yorktown, where he waited for reinforcements. Gen. Washington, apprised of Cornwallis’ movements and Greene’s victories in the South, changed his own plans. He abandoned his siege of the British Army in New York City and force-marched his main army over five hundred miles to Virginia intending to crush Cornwallis and inflict a fatal blow to the British Army. Supported by French troops, Washington surrounded Cornwallis in Yorktown. On October 17, 1781, Cornwallis surrendered to Washington. While fighting continued for the next two years, the surrender of Cornwallis effectively deprived the British of any realistic opportunity to defeat the Continental Army.[89]

Cornwallis failed to win the Southern Campaign because of his own mistakes and because of Greene’s superior tactics. Cultivating Loyalist support in the Carolinas’ was essential to the British effort, but the actions of Cornwallis and his subordinates effectively alienated residents of the backcountry. Greene also rose to the moment, adapting military tactics to achieve his objective of wearing down the British. He recognized, unlike Horatio Gates who stumbled headlong into Camden, that his force would not likely win a conventional campaign against the better-trained British Army. Greene had to rely upon unpredictable militia units to support his trained regular soldiers; and Greene used the militias effectively. He allowed the militias to disperse at strategic moments, reducing the logistical demands of his Army and speeding his evasive maneuvers out in front of Cornwallis.[90] Greene learned that he could reform his troop strength by calling the militias back at strategic moments, as he did for the Battle of Guilford Courthouse. Greene was also patient, willing to evade Cornwallis until the conditions better suited his troops. Perhaps most significantly, Greene could accept a partial, tactical defeat, surrendering the field of battle after a conflict, while avoiding a larger, operational defeat that would result in the complete surrender of his army. He did not press the battle at Guilford Courthouse towards a decisive conclusion, for example, but held back his reserves and withdrew in good order in order to fight another day. Greene’s “victory in defeat” strategy allowed him to sap the strength of an imposing enemy while preserving his own army.[91]

After the war, Nathanael Greene returned to his home in Rhode Island. South Carolina and Georgia awarded him plantations as a token of gratitude of his service during the war. Greene sold the South Carolina plantation to settle his debts. In 1785, he moved his family to Mulberry Grove, the plantation outside of Savannah, Georgia that had been the home of the former loyalist lieutenant governor John Graham. On June 19, 1786, Greene died at age forty-four after a brief illness.[92]

Between May 1780 and December 1782, when the British evacuated Charleston, the American and British forces fought more than 40 battles and skirmishes across Georgia and the Carolinas. While many of the engagements were tactical victories for the British Army, American troops prevented the British from achieving their objective of raising Loyalist support and driving the Continental Army from the region.

President Gerald Ford March 1976 (NPS)

Endnotes

¹See for example: “History and Culture,” National Park Service, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/guco/learn/historyculture/index.htm.

²“Stories from the Revolution,” National Park Service, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/revwar/ about_the_revolution/capsule_history.html

³“The American Revolution: 1763-1783,” The Library of Congress, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/

⁴John Shy, “British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781,” in The Southern Experience in the American Revolution, ed. Jeffery J. Crow and Larry E. Tise (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1978), 160.

⁵Lawrence Edward Babits and Joshua B. Howard, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 6.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Frances Kennedy, The American Revolution: A Historical Guidebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 214.

⁸Henry Lumpkin, From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South (Lincoln, NE: to Excel Press, 2000), 64.

⁹Scott D. Aiken, The Swamp Fox: Lessons in Leadership from the Partisan Campaigns of Francis Marion (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2012).

¹⁰Dameron, David J., King’s Mountain: The Defeat of the Loyalists, October 7, 1780 (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2003).

¹¹“The American Revolution, 1763-1783: Revolutionary War: Southern Phase, 1778-1781,” Library of Congress, accessed July 1, 2015, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/south/greene.html

¹²William Gilmore Simms, The Life of Nathanael Greene, Major General in the Army of the Revolution (New York: Derby and Jackson, 1856), 116.

¹³Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) and “The Battle of Cowpens,” National Park Service, accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/cowp/learn/ historyculture/the-battle-of-cowpens.htm.

¹⁴Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 13-14.

¹⁵Quoted in ibid., 15.

¹⁶Quoted in ibid., 16.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., 17-18.

¹⁹Ibid., 22.

²⁰Ibid., 25-26.

²¹Ibid., 27.

²²Ibid., 28.

²³John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolina’s (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 351.

²⁴Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 29.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Courtland T. Reid, Guilford Courthouse National Military Park, North Carolina, Historical Handbook Series No. 30 (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, Department of the Interior, 1959; reprint 1960).

²⁷Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 36.

²⁸Reid, Guilford Courthouse National Military Park, North Carolina.

²⁹Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 360.

³⁰John Hairr, Guilford Courthouse: Nathanael Greene’s Victory in Defeat, March 15, 1781, Battleground America Guides (Da Capo Press, 2002), 70.

³¹John S. D. Eisenhower and W. J. Wood, Battles of the Revolutionary War: 1775-1781 (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2003), 240-241.

³²Reynolds, William R. Andrew Pickens: South Carolina Patriot in the Revolutionary War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co., 2012), 247.

³³Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 39.

³⁴Ibid., 59.;Thomas E. Baker, Another Such Victory: The Story of the American Defeat at Guilford Courthouse That Helped Win the War for Independence (New York: Eastern Acorn, 1981), 43-45.

³⁵Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 59-60.

³⁶Ibid., 60-61. Lawrence E. Babits and Joshua B. Howard, Fortitude and Forbearance: The North Carolina Continental Line in the Revolutionary War, 1775-1783 (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Office of Archives and History, 2004), 152.

³⁷Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 61-62.

³⁸Ibid., 62. Baker, Another Such Victory, 44-45.

³⁹Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody,64-66.

⁴⁰Ibid., 66-67.

⁴¹Quoted in ibid., 68.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 68-

⁴⁴Ibid., 70-71.

⁴⁵Ibid., 72-74.

⁴⁶Quoted in ibid., 77.; Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 373.

⁴⁷Babits, Long, Obstinate, and Bloody, 72-74.

⁴⁸Ibid., 77-78.

⁴⁹Buchanan, The Road to Guildford Courthouse, 374.

⁵⁰Ibid., 94.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 374.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 96.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., 99.

⁶⁰Ibid., 100.

⁶¹Ibid., 101.

⁶²Ibid., 102.

⁶³Ibid., 103.

⁶⁴Ibid., 101-02.

⁶⁵Ibid., 104.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., 106.

⁶⁸Ibid., 108.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., 108-09.

⁷¹Ibid., 113.

⁷²Ibid., 114.

⁷³Ibid., 114-15.

⁷⁴Ibid., 117.

⁷⁵Ibid., 119.

⁷⁶Ibid., 122.

⁷⁷Ibid., 142.

⁷⁸Ibid., 143.

⁷⁹Ibid., 147.

⁸⁰Ibid., 148-49.

⁸¹Ibid., 152.

⁸²Ibid., 153.

⁸³Ibid., 164.

⁸⁴Ibid., 170.

⁸⁵Ibid., 164-71.

⁸⁶Ibid., 180.

⁸⁷Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse, 380.

⁸⁸Ibid., 181.

⁸⁹David Lee Russell, The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2000), 302.

⁹⁰Dennis Conrad, “General Nathanial Greene,” in General Nathanael Greene and the American Revolution in the South, ed. Gregory D. Massey and Jim Piecuch (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 15.

⁹¹Jim Piecuch, “The Evolving Tactician: Nathanial Greene at the Battle of Eutaw Springs,” in General Nathanael Greene and the American Revolution in the South, ed. Gregory D. Massey and Jim Piecuch (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 214-15.

⁹²Gregory Massey, “The Transformation of Nathanael Greene,” in General Nathanael Greene and the American Revolution in the South, ed. Gregory D. Massey and Jim Piecuch (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 257.

            Text from Historic Resource Study, Guilford Courthouse National Military Park, WLA Studio, January 2017.

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